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In the current health care system, high costs without proportional improvements in quality or outcome have
prompted widespread calls for change in how we deliver and pay for care. Value-based health care delivery
models have been proposed. Multiple impediments exist to achieving value, including misaligned patient
and provider incentives, information asymmetries, convoluted and opaque cost structures, and cultural
attitudes toward cancer treatment. Radiation oncology as a specialty has recently become a focus of the
value discussion. Escalating costs secondary to rapidly evolving technologies, safety breaches, and variable,
nonstandardized structures and processes of delivering care have garnered attention. In response, we
present a framework for the value discussion in radiation oncology and identify approaches for attaining
value, including economic and structural models, process improvements, outcome measurement, and
cost assessment.
J Clin Oncol 32:2864-2870. © 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology

“Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing.”
—Lord Henry Wotton, from The Picture of
Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the continued and unsustainable rise
in health care spending in the United States (fast
approaching 20% of GDP)1 without a proportional
rise in quality or improvement in outcomes has
raised critical questions about the inevitable need for
change in our current health care delivery system.
Patients, health care providers, and payers all desire
improvement in health outcomes with simultaneous control of rising costs. Transformation to a
value-based health care delivery model is proposed
to address the challenge.2,3 The value proposition in
health care represents an elusive yet highly soughtafter goal for our health care system and for the
specialty of radiation oncology. Herein, we discuss
the meaning of value, the current economic landscape and impediments to achieving value, and
some considerations for achieving a value-based
health care delivery model in the future.
VALUE DEFINED

To address the question of how to achieve value in
health care delivery, we must first understand what
value is. In the world outside of medicine, a so-called
good value is a desirable product or service that can
2864
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be purchased for a fair price. The definition of value
will vary depending on several factors, including the
social identity and the social context of the person
purchasing the product or service. For instance,
value in automobile purchasing will mean different
things to a consumer who prefers luxury cars than it
will to one who prefers an off-road vehicle or an
economy car. The desirable product or service as
well as the fair price is in the eye of the beholder. This
concept rings true in defining value in health care as
well. Michael Porter, a leading proponent of the
value proposition in health care, defines value as
health outcomes divided by costs. He points out that
“value should always be defined around the
customer.”4(p2477) In this vein, we would argue in
line with the classic Donabedian model, that health
care structure and process, along with outcomes,
are highly relevant considerations in the value
proposition (Table 1).5 Structure refers to the
context in which care is delivered, including facilities, organizational characteristics, and, importantly for radiation oncology, equipment and
technology. Process encompasses all components
of health care delivery, including interactions between patient and physician and the technical
delivery of care. Outcomes refer to the effects of
health care on patients and include both objective
(eg, survival) and subjective outcome measures
(eg, quality of life). Intuitively, structure, process,
and outcome fundamentally affect the patient’s
experience when interfacing with the health care
system and inherently matter to an individual’s
value equation.

Value Framework for Radiation Oncology

Table 1. Current Challenges to Achieving Value
Structure

Process

Outcomes

Costs

Global

System: lack of cross-specialty Inadequate emphasis on
Inadequate systems for
Not well measured for
Information asymmetries
integration of care
accessibility, timeliness,
longitudinal discrete data
disease process, nor for
between patients and
and coordination of care
capture (eg, registries)
cycles of care
providers
Provider centered, not patient Lack of standardized instruments Financial incentives toward Overutilization driven by moral
Setting: lack of meaningful
centered
for patient-reported outcomes
overutilization
hazard and provider-induced
practice standardization/
demand
accreditation
Provider: lack of meaningful
Insufficient evidence-based
Inadequate subjective and
Not transparent and
Difficulties in risk stratification
practice standardization/
guidelines/best practices
objective outcome data for
not commensurate with
between patient groups
certification
and lack of incentivized
quality assessment
quality
hinder comparison
adherence

CURRENT ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE AND CHALLENGES TO
ACHIEVING VALUE

Describing the Cost Conundrum
Remarkably, inability to assess cost poses the greatest challenge in
determining value in health care. Providers and administrators do not
have clarity on the various components of care that need to be measured or what the actual costs of these components are. Although
providers often know what they charge and may know many of the
individual direct costs within a radiation oncology clinic, they nevertheless are unable to calculate the total cost of a treatment administered at the patient level. In this regard, because costs are borne by
providers and repaid by insurers and patients, providers approximate
costs by using billing charges or reimbursement, not the calculated
total cost of providing care. From a system point of view, the situation
is further complicated by the fact that charges for the same procedure can vary widely among different providers. There is no good
justification beyond the notion of free market for this practice. The
inability to consistently and reproducibly measure costs is a manifest impediment to overcome if we are to address the value proposition in radiation oncology.
Economic Incentives, Utility, and Cost
The lack of understanding about cost and the other components
of value creates difficulties for all stakeholders in health care. For
example, the patient’s lack of clarity regarding value creates an incongruity that can lead to increased cost, over- and underutilization, and
decreased quality. Economists believe that consumers are utility
maximizers—that is, they will choose to have the highest utility for the
lowest dollar. Utility is defined in economic terms as usefulness (ie,
ability of something to satisfy needs or wants). However, in health
care, there is no reliable or consistent correlation between cost and
utility. Radiation oncology clinics can be paid the same for a given
service, but without an equal outcome or quality of the service provided. At the same time, charges widely vary among cancer treatment
facilities. Medical device pricing is equally opaque; when surveyed,
most physicians cannot correctly estimate the price of medical devices
they routinely use.6,7 If this were the case for products outside of health
care, the market would naturally drive the price of the costlier item
toward that of cheaper substitutes, because consumers would not pay
a higher price for a nonsuperior product. So why does the opposite
often happen in health care? The answer lies in deficiency of information; consumers do not know the real costs or quality offered by
different providers. Moreover, patients often assume equality in these
www.jco.org

factors. In economics terms, there is an information asymmetry between the providers and consumers of health care.8 If patients do not
know how a provider ranks in terms of key factors that inform utility,
they cannot truly be utility maximizers. Therefore, a situation exists in
our current encounter-based, frequency-rewarding, fee-for-service
health care payment system where providers do not understand their
own true costs and cannot rationally or rigorously relate their charges
to actual cost or quality. At the same time, the patient/consumer also
lacks needed practical information to make informed decisions regarding purchase of health care. From a value perspective, our health
care market is remarkably inefficient, where both sides of the transaction have high levels of unreliable critical information. In response,
payers have proposed and in some cases have attempted to link aspects
of payment to various quality indicators. To date, there is a dearth of
validated quality indicators that can be used as quality measures linked
to payment in radiation oncology. Those that do exist are said to not
have a demonstrable effect of lowering cost or improving quality.
Consequently, in our current circumstance, the predominant market
response of payers is to grind on unit price whenever possible. This
maneuver is performed without valid consideration of the true cost
of care or an understanding of the value to the patient or to society
of the care supplied. In some market situations, technical services
for radiation oncology are contracted at what seem to be marginal
rates, without consideration of the actual cost of delivering the care
or maintaining its quality and safety. The situation is further confounded in certain submarkets where issues of payer mix create
inadequate access for some patients while other patients receive
unneeded treatment.9-13
As costs continue to rise at troubling rates, patient, consumers,
payers, providers, and society are all beginning to ask: Are the costs of
medical services commensurate with the utility provided? Where do
high costs come from? A basic tenet of economics is that incentives are
major determinants of people’s behaviors and choices. Many experts
attribute high costs to misaligned incentives among the various stakeholders in health care—that is, the goals of patients, providers, and
payers are not always aligned. Specifically, health policy analysts are
fast coming to the conclusion that the fee-for-service payment system,
which reimburses providers based on volume of service and not on
quality or value, encourages overuse and overprescription, leading to
higher overall costs.14 In addition, the simplistic payer response to the
cost spiral—that of merely lowering reimbursement for provider
services—instead results in a volume behavior effect, which further
exacerbates the situation.15 In this milieu, information asymmetries,
together with misaligned financial incentives, create the so-called
© 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology
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principal-agent problem, which may in turn lead to supplier-induced
demand. Patients (ie, principals) assume that their physicians (ie,
agents), who have more information about medical treatments, will
act in the principals’ best interest. However, when the agent has an
incentive to recommend one treatment over another, the principalagent problem emerges. Striking examples of supplier-induced demand for radiation therapy services were recently described in a New
England Journal of Medicine article noting urologists’ increased use of
intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) in prostate cancer
when they had an economic stake in the radiation therapy treatment
equipment. The study demonstrated that when urologists had ownership in radiotherapy practices in the setting of limited specialty groups
(⬍ four specialties), their patients were significantly more likely to
receive IMRT for prostate cancer as opposed to other less expensive
treatment options. This phenomenon even extended to their patients
who were age ⬎ 80 years.9 The agent—in this case, a self-referring
physician—acts in his own economic best interest rather than in the
principal’s medical interest. In a similar study conducted by the US
Government Accountability Office, however, when the ownership
interest was dispersed within multispecialty groups with ⬎ 20 specialties, the principal-agent problem notably disappeared.16

can look to the basic economic concept of supply and demand. The
demand for health care, as with any product, depends on five main
factors: OOP costs, income, prices of other complementary or substitute goods and services, tastes or utility, and expectations. The cost of
health care, in one form or another, involves all five of the factors that
affect demand. Economists once believed the demand curve for health
care was relatively inelastic—that is, a rise in price of health care
minimally influenced the demand for health care. But this theory
probably applies only to well-insured patients. The manifest risk is that
as OOP health costs rise and incomes remain flat throughout the
country, the demand curve may begin to look more elastic—that is,
patients will demand less routine medical care and only seek medical
attention when they are exceptionally ill. Patients may also demand
less medical care as the prices of complementary goods (eg, medications) rise or price of substitutes (eg, housing, education, food) rise.
We now know that costs clearly matter to patients— even patients
with cancer. Therefore, patient understanding of the incremental benefit of a particular treatment or procedure is one aspect of achieving
high value. This understanding can alter the patient demand equation,
both by decreasing the cost component and by changing patient utility
and expectations of medical care.

Patient Incentives to Choose High-Value Care
What incentives do patients have to choose high-value health
care? Although providers may have incentives to create supplierinduced demand, patients have their own misaligned incentives that
prevent the attainment of value. For example, moral hazard arises
when patients who are insured by a third party (eg, employer, government) have access to comprehensive health care plans for which they
pay only a small fraction of the total cost. Various studies have shown
that patients use more medical services when they have more generous
health plans that are less restricted or require less cost sharing.17-19 To
address moral hazard, health plans have increased cost sharing by
using copayments and higher deductibles. However, this practice
may be counterproductive in achieving value; it runs the risk of
preventing patients from pursuing necessary, high cost–sharing
medical treatments.20-22 By attempting to curb overutilization of
medical services in this way, insurers may actually be worsening
patients’ health and increasing ultimate associated costs of their
covered populations.

ACHIEVING VALUE IN RADIATION ONCOLOGY

Special Case of the Patient With Cancer
The patient with cancer presents a special case for payment reform. There is a heretofore prevailing attitude that cancer is, to some
extent, a so-called sacred cow when it comes to reining in cost— even
the cost associated with futile care. One study reported that inflationadjusted direct medical spending on cancer care exhibited a 50%
higher growth rate compared with the rest of health care over a 20-year
period.23 Informing a particular dilemma for patients with cancer,
recent studies have highlighted the effect that out-of-pocket (OOP)
costs have on patients’ ability to access medical care and ability to pay
for other, nonmedical, life necessities.24-27 Medicare patients with
cancer pay substantially more OOP than patients without cancer, and
adjuvant radiotherapy and systemic chemotherapies contribute to the
discrepancy.28 As a partial solution to this problem, it is advocated that
clinicians have frank discussions with patients about incremental benefit and the costs of prescribed treatments and procedures.22,29 To
understand why OOP costs affect patients’ access to health care, we
2866
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Radiation oncology is an arcane, technology-based, tertiary specialty.
It is rooted in costly technology infrastructure that is ever evolving,
and proper treatment delivery is critically dependent on a team effort
requiring not only physicians and nurses but also specially trained
physicists, dosmetrists, and radiation therapists. As an obscure specialty, until recently, radiation oncology was rarely mentioned in discussions of health care reform. However, notable recent events have
shifted the spotlight onto the specialty. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services identified the billing code associated with IMRT as
one of the top 10 codes across all specialties contributing to Medicare
spending growth from 2004 to 2010.30 The New York Times ran a series
of articles highlighting injuries sustained by overdoses of therapeutic radiation,31-33 and numerous articles have questioned the value
of high-cost proton-beam therapy.34-36 These and other highprofile references to radiation oncology highlighting cost and potential safety concerns have incited a newfound health policy
interest in radiation oncology.
As a framework for discussing value in radiation oncology, we
will modify the Porter value equation (value ⫽ outcomes/cost) by
expanding the numerator to include structure and process along with
outcomes consistent with the Donabedian model for quality.5 Hence,
expanding the Porter equation to include structure and process essentially transforms the value equation as follows: value ⫽ quality/cost
(Fig. 1).
Structure
Structural components of medical care include “the adequacy
of facilities and equipment; the qualifications of medical staff and
their organization; the administrative structure and operations of
programs and institutions providing care; fiscal organization and the
like.”5(p695) In recent years, radiation therapy has become significantly
more sophisticated, with enhanced complexity in all of its treatment
modalities, including brachytherapy, IMRT, and stereotactic radiation. To address rising concerns about ensuring proper structure for
JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
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Process
Patient centered
Coordinated
Accessible
Evidence based

Structure
Accredited
Integrated
Technologically
current
Safe

Outcomes
Objective
Subjective,
patient reported
Publicly available

Value

Costs
Transparent
Measured through
full cycle of care
Related to quality

Fig 1. Key components of value.

the delivery of radiation oncology care, several initiatives attempting
to standardize the structural components required to advance highvalue care have emerged. In 2012, a consortium of 12 radiation oncology societies authored “Safety Is No Accident,” which set forth specific
requirements for radiation oncology facilities with regard to structure,
personnel, and technical processes to ensure a safe environment for
the delivery of radiation therapy.37 In 2013, the American Society
for Radiation Oncology (ASTRO) put forth detailed draft standards
for practice accreditation, which included structure and a few process
elements.38 The ASTRO Accreditation Program for Excellence
(APEX) will provide third-party, impartial peer review of personnel,
equipment, treatment planning, medical records, patient-safety policies, and quality control/quality assessment activities. As with previous
radiation oncology practice accreditation programs, the draft standards stress structural elements, but an emerging new emphasis on
process should be noted. The American Society for Clinical Oncology
(ASCO) has created its own quality assessment and improvement
programs for the medical oncology community.39 In addition, ASCO
certifies oncology practices that have surpassed certain quality thresholds via its Quality Certification Program, akin to the ASTRO APEX.
In theory, achieving practice accreditation would indicate a threshold
for quality and in effect impart a seal of approval for referring physicians, prospective patients, peers, regulatory agencies, and payers.
However, implementation of these efforts leads to the following question: Do these parties know or care about accreditation or what the
process certifies? Currently, payers do not mandate accreditation, nor
are there meaningful economic incentives to seek or maintain accreditation. Such a mandate would facilitate the setting of a quality threshold and would address one of the major criticisms and detractors of
value for the specialty: widespread variation in structure not otherwise
linked to quality.
New Economic and Structural Incentives to Decrease
Cost and Improve Value
Newer coverage models that incentivize patients to choose highvalue providers by allowing a credit or discount on their copay if they
choose high-value hospitals and providers (those that report their
outcomes and costs) are emerging. Some large employers have started
to pay for employees’ elective cardiac and orthopedic surgical care,
travel, lodging, and food costs if they have their procedures performed
at what benefit managers consider to be high-value institutions. These
www.jco.org

so-called high-value or preferred providers presumably practice using
established standards characterized by optimal patient selection, treatment delivery, and outcomes. For radiation therapy, the notion of
preferred providers for certain high-stakes procedures such as
brachytherapy or stereotactic radiation could potentially encourage patients to select high-value providers who meet certain standards of quality and cost. Incentives would be actively aligned;
patients spend less (via premium credit or discount for OOP costs)
for consistent care, and insurers spend a predetermined amount for
selected high-value providers. Once again, with the deficit of clear
quality indicators, difficulties with risk stratification, and ongoing
inconsistency and disagreement regarding patient selection and the
process of treatment delivery, there exists a risk that lowest cost would
primarily drive the selection of providers.
A related example of a market-based pricing arrangement, directed at patient health care purchasing behavior and intended to
decrease cost and improve value, is the so-called narrow or tiered
network offered by health plans. According to the health plans, narrow
provider networks are chosen based on quality and cost. However,
given the current relative absence of quality indicators in radiation
oncology, involvement by providers in these tiered networks is
typically based on price or provider relationships with a larger
market-dominant entity. Nevertheless, payment reform has caused
acceleration of these narrow network products, at times as components of accountable care organizations (ACOs). To maximize value
and provide sustainable affordability for consumers, ACOs devise new
payment mechanisms, including performance-based contracts, bundles of care and episodes of care payments, shared risk between provider and payer, and capitated payment.40,41 In some markets,
clinically integrated networks are intended to combine broad market
coverage with global risk-sharing payment methodologies to address
the cost and quality imperatives. In this regard, some have predicted
that the health care market is likely to shift from traditional openaccess preferred provider organizations to these new ACO models.
The intent of these coverage vehicles is to focus on quality and cost. It
is proposed that these new health plan offerings will be less about being
narrow networks and more about a care delivery model that provides
the highest efficiency and best value for the consumer. Although the
form and execution of these evolving concepts of payment reform are
not yet known, and their effects on radiation oncology care are uncertain, they pose clear incentives to integrate episodes of cancer care
around treatment directives, clear patient-centered processes of care,
and validated outcome metrics.
In this regard, integration of medical practice across the continuum of care has been identified as a high-value organizational structure for delivery of health care, particularly in the management of
complex diseases such as cancer.3 In the specific case of integrated
practice units (IPUs), teams of clinical and nonclinical personnel
provide care through the entire continuum of the disease process.2
Critical features of the IPU model include the shared development and
use of care pathways and treatment directives following evidencebased guidelines, as well as feedback mechanisms for continual refinement and improvement of care. This model also delineates utilization
of resources through each step of the process of care, with an eye
toward economic efficiency and patient convenience. Through the
IPU approach, overuse of tests and procedures is reduced. Value is not
© 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology
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only achieved through cost savings enabled by this care delivery structure, but is further enhanced by the increased use of the patientcentered shared treatment decision-making paradigm. Radiation
oncologists are aware that misleading or incorrect information delivered upstream to the patient’s radiation oncology encounter in the
traditional referral-based process of care can obfuscate the decisionmaking process for the patient. The IPU model obviates that issue for
the patient, thereby further improving value.42
The concept of integration of care is not new, but until recently, it
was slow to catch on. New initiatives in integration of care, such as
medical and surgical homes as well as cross-specialty integration of
cancer care, have recently gained traction.3,41,43 Patient-centered integration of care requires reassessment of the traditional interactions
between subspecialists and ancillary staff, as well as the siloed use of
physical space. The quest for value in health reform enables new
reimbursement models that can transform the ways providers deliver
care.40 As payers and providers realize that fragmented care is inefficient, costs too much, and is not patient centric, the market is beginning to appreciate value-bundled payments for entire episodes of care.
IPUs create a care delivery structure that enhances value because the
patient is followed through an entire continuum of care for a given
condition, making the measurement of all components of care possible. The IPU structure can inform the process and cost components of
value as well as create value.
Process
Process encompasses all components of health care delivery, including interactions between patient and physician and the technical
delivery of care. Some components of process can be readily observed
and appreciated by patients, whereas others, which may be of critical
import in a technologically advanced specialty like radiation oncology,
are less readily appreciated. Patients may value care delivery in an
esthetically pleasing environment, service with a smile, shared decision making, and timely coordinated care. However, just as critical to
achieving true quality are less tangible components, including physician expertise and medical physics quality assurance oversight for
treatment planning and delivery. With regard to physician expertise,
radiation oncology has much in common with surgery. It is a locoregional treatment strategy, procedural in nature, reliant on technologic
advances, and ever evolving. The concept of the learning curve is well
known in the surgical literature, as is establishing proficiency
through procedure-specific training, proctoring, and outcome
review.44-50 Several studies have also highlighted the importance of
a learning curve for radiation oncology techniques, including
brachytherapy procedures, IMRT volume delineation, and techni-

cal IMRT delivery.51-54 Repeated performance of best practices and
standardization of care where possible are clearly associated with
improved outcomes in both the operating room and intensive care
unit settings.55-57
As regards radiation oncology, Radiation Therapy Oncology
Group (RTOG) cooperative group clinical trials are an example of
effective practice standardization. These trials specify treatmentplanning specifics, including contouring guidelines, dose constraints,
planning techniques, and trial compliance criteria. Centralized review
processes, including rapid review of initial protocol cases and timely
review of subsequent cases, ensure proficiency and ultimately quality.
Studies examining the impact of compliance with treatment-planning
specifics in cooperative group trials suggest that protocol deviations
are associated with inferior outcomes.54,58,59
In recent years, the emphasis of the specialty has been directed
toward defining indications for radiation therapy by the promulgation
of so-called evidence-based guidelines. Significantly less emphasis has
been placed on defining process-focused optimal treatment delivery.
As a result, there remains considerable variation in practice and a lack
of standardization of technical delivery of care. Defining excellence in
technical delivery of radiation therapy is necessary to allow for proper
assessment and accountability. The budding best practices initiative of
ASTRO, based on the RAND/University of California Los Angeles
appropriateness criteria,60 serves to address this important deficit in
refining the process of care in radiation oncology.
Outcomes
Outcomes comprise multiple measures that can be categorized
on a spectrum spanning from the finitely objective to the qualitatively
subjective. Objective outcomes are the ones that providers and payers
have customarily measured: health status, such as disease control and
survival; functional physical status and pain level; time to recovery;
disease recurrence; complications of treatment; and rate of disease
prevention. Subjective outcomes are considered by some observers to
have so-called softer end points, with methodologies for their measurement that may not necessarily comport with traditionally accepted scientific methods. They are, nevertheless, of equal importance
in the value discussion. These subjective measures include patientreported outcomes, psychosocial ramifications of the disease or treatment, ability to maintain employment status, and measurement of the
patient’s understanding of his or her medical condition. Of the proposed components of value, the medical community is best at measuring outcomes on the objective side of the spectrum. In this regard,
there is general agreement within the specialty of radiation oncology
that the scope and detail of its objective outcome metrics should be

Table 2. Proposed Steps for Creating Value in Radiation Oncology
Structure

Process

Outcomes

Engage integrated practice unit
models for delivery of care

Optimize accessibility, timeliness,
and care coordination

Measure both objective and
subjective outcomes

Promote or mandate accreditation
to reduce variation among
practices
Encourage patients to select
providers who meet high-value
standards

Establish process standards that
are patient centered and safety
focused
Facilitate patient access to
information about process
aspects of their care

Create easy-to-use national registries
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Report outcomes, guideline adherence,
and best practice adherence among
providers

Costs
Measure all costs involved
with providing care for
given episode of care
Move beyond billed charges
and know true total
cost for cycle of care
Drive value via payment
reform strategies
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enhanced. However, development of desired high-quality and highlevel medical evidence is both labor-intensive and costly. In addition,
important issues such as risk stratification pose a challenge in comparing outcomes between providers and various treatment modalities
and regimens. Specialty-based and cross-disciplinary integrated realtime observational registries are emerging as a method to help
address deficits of information about treatment outcomes.61,62
Likewise, patient-reported outcomes in radiation oncology could
not only inform translational and comparative effectiveness research, health care technology assessment, and quality assurance,
but may also be used as a basis to quantify value from a patient
perspective and potentially be used as an aspect of reimbursement.63 With regard to the processes and outcomes of care, those
aspects of care that are apparent and matter to patients are best
measured by directly asking patients about their experience with
their health care. Radiation oncology–specific instruments for
patient-reported outcomes are currently in development.64

dardizing structures and processes that reduce variation in care and
ensure high quality, while simultaneously rigorously measuring process, outcomes, and costs. In addition, the measurement of health
outcomes must now transcend current convention and address elements that matter to the patient and embrace the patient’s sense of
value. In this regard, measuring the cost of care, for a field in which
high cost is an overarching problem, is nothing short of critical. Finally, reorganizing care though patient-centered integration of practice is foundational to creating value, because it facilitates the
measurement of outcomes and cost through the entire continuum,
and it puts patients first.
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esoteric (Table 2). However, the core of this value transformation for
radiation oncology involves the arduous task of establishing and stanREFERENCES
1. Fuchs VR: The gross domestic product and
health care spending. N Engl J Med 369:107-109,
2013
2. Porter ME: A strategy for health care reform:
Toward a value-based system. N Engl J Med 361:
109-112, 2009
3. Porter ME, Lee TH: The strategy that will fix
health care. Harvard Business Review, October
2013
4. Porter ME: What is value in health care?
N Engl J Med 363:2477-2481, 2010
5. Donabedian A: Evaluating the quality of medical care: 1966. Milbank Q 83:691-729, 2005
6. Pauly MV, Burns LR: Price transparency for
medical devices. Health Aff (Millwood) 27:15441553, 2008
7. Okike K, O’Toole RV, Pollack AN, et al: Survey
finds few orthopedic surgeons know the costs of
the devices they implant. Health Aff (Millwood)
33:103-109, 2014
8. Steinberg ML: Introduction: Health policy and
health care economics observed. Semin Radiat Oncol 18:149-151, 2008
9. Mitchell JM: Urologists’ use of intensitymodulated radiation therapy for prostate cancer.
N Engl J Med 369:1629-1637, 2013
10. Mitchell JM: Urologists’ self-referral for pathology of biopsy specimens linked to increased use
and lower prostate cancer detection. Health Aff
(Millwood) 31:741-749, 2012
11. Hershman DL, Unger JM, Barlow WE, et al:
Treatment quality and outcomes of African American versus white breast cancer patients: Retrospective analysis of Southwest Oncology studies S8814/
S8897. J Clin Oncol 27:2157-2162, 2009
www.jco.org

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Conception and design: All authors
Collection and assembly of data: Sewit Teckie, Michael L. Steinberg
Data analysis and interpretation: Sewit Teckie, Michael L. Steinberg
Manuscript writing: All authors
Final approval of manuscript: All authors

12. Gwyn K, Bondy ML, Cohen DS, et al: Racial
differences in diagnosis, treatment, and clinical delays in a population-based study of patients with
newly diagnosed breast carcinoma. Cancer 100:
1595-1604, 2004
13. Bickell NA, Wang JJ, Oluwole S, et al: Missed
opportunities: Racial disparities in adjuvant breast
cancer treatment. J Clin Oncol 24:1357-1362, 2006
14. Davidson SM: Open questions concerning
influences on clinical decision making. J Ambul Care
Manage 36:88-107, 2013
15. He D, Mellor JM: Hospital volume responses
to Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System: Evidence from Florida. J Health Econ 31:730743, 2012
16. US Government Accountability Office: Higher
Use of Costly Prostate Cancer Treatment by Providers Who Self-Refer Warrants Scrutiny. http://www
.gao.gov/assets/660/656026.pdf
17. Lohr KN, Brook RH, Kamberg CJ, et al: Use of
medical care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis- and service-specific analyses in a
randomized controlled trial. Med Care 24:S1-S87,
1986 (suppl)
18. Brook RH, Ware JE, Rogers WH, et al: The
Effect of Coinsurance on the Health of Adults:
Results from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 1984
19. Goldman DP, Joyce GF, Zheng Y: Prescription
drug cost sharing: Associations with medication and
medical utilization and spending and health. JAMA
298:61-69, 2007
20. Keeler EB, Sloss EM, Brook RH, et al: Effects
of cost sharing on physiological health, health practices, and worry. Health Serv Res 22:279-306, 1987
21. Chandra A, Gruber J, McKnight R: The impact
of patient cost-sharing on low-income populations:

Evidence from Massachusetts. J Health Econ 33:5766, 2014
22. Moriates C, Shah NT, Arora VM: First, do no
(financial) harm. JAMA 310:577-578, 2013
23. Elkin EB, Bach PB: Cancer’s next frontier:
Addressing high and increasing costs. JAMA 303:
1086-1087, 2010
24. Timmons A, Gooberman-Hill R, Sharp L: “It’s
at a time in your life when you are most vulnerable”:
A qualitative exploration of the financial impact of a
cancer diagnosis and implications for financial protection in health. PLoS One 8:e77549, 2013
25. Zafar SY, Peppercorn JM, Schrag D, et al: The
financial toxicity of cancer treatment: A pilot study
assessing out-of-pocket expenses and the insured
cancer patient’s experience. Oncologist 18:381-390,
2013
26. Wong YN, Egleston BL, Sachdeva K, et al:
Cancer patients’ trade-offs among efficacy, toxicity,
and out-of-pocket cost in the curative and noncurative setting. Med Care 51:838-845, 2013
27. Ito K, Elkin E, Blinder V, et al: Costeffectiveness of full coverage of aromatase inhibitors for Medicare beneficiaries with early breast
cancer. Cancer 119:2494-2502, 2013
28. Davidoff AJ, Erten M, Schaffer T, et al: Out-ofpocket health care expenditure burden for Medicare
beneficiaries with cancer. Cancer 119:1257-1265,
2013
29. Ubel PA, Abernethy AP, Zafar SY: Full disclosure: Out-of-pocket costs as side effects. N Engl
J Med 369:1484-1486, 2013
30. Alhassani A, Chandra A, Chernew ME: The
sources of the SGR “hole.” N Engl J Med 366:289291, 2012
31. Bogdanich W: Radiation offers new cures,
and ways to do harm. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/24/health/24radiation.html?_r⫽0

© 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology

2869

Teckie, McCloskey, and Steinberg

32. Bogdanich W: As technology surges, radiation
safeguards lag. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/
27/us/27radiation.html?pagewanted⫽all
33. Boganich W, Rebelo K: A pinpoint beam
strays invisibly, harming instead of healing.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/29/health/
29radiation.html?pagewanted⫽all
34. Elnahal SM, Kerstiens J, Helsper RS, et al:
Proton beam therapy and accountable care: The
challenges ahead. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys
85:e165-e172, 2013
35. Lievens Y, Pijls-Johannesma M: Health economic controversy and cost-effectiveness of proton
therapy. Semin Radiat Oncol 23:134-141, 2013
36. Wallner PE, Steinberg ML, Konski AA: Controversies in the adoption of new healthcare technologies. Front Radiat Ther Oncol 43:60-78, 2011
37. American Society for Radiation Oncology:
Safety is No Accident: A Framework for Quality
Radiation Oncology and Care. https://www.astro.org/
uploadedFiles/Main_Site/Clinical_Practice/Patient_
Safety/Blue_Book/SafetyisnoAccident.pdf
38. American Society for Radiation Oncology:
Apex: Accreditation program for excellence. https://
www.astro.org/Practice-Management/PracticeAccreditation/Index.aspx
39. American Society of Clinical Oncology: Quality Oncology Practice Initiative (QOPI). http://qopi
.asco.org/
40. Klein I, Kolodziej M: Private payers and cancer
care: Land of opportunity. J Oncol Pract 10:15-19, 2014
41. Enthoven AC, Crosson FJ, Shortell SM: ‘Redefining health care’: Medical homes or archipelagos to
navigate? Health Aff (Millwood) 26:1366-1372, 2007
42. Steinberg M: Presidential address. https://www
.astro.org/uploadedFiles/Main_Site/News_and_Media/
ASTROnews/Annual_Meeting_Wrap_Up_2012/
astronewsAMwrap_up_2012.pdf
43. Bosserman LD, Verrilli D, McNatt W: Partnering with a payer to develop a value-based medical
home pilot: A West Coast practice’s experience.
J Oncol Pract 8:38s-40s, 2012 (suppl)

44. Birkmeyer JD, Siewers AE, Finlayson EV, et
al: Hospital volume and surgical mortality in the
United States. N Engl J Med 346:1128-1137, 2002
45. Vickers AJ, Bianco FJ, Serio AM, et al: The
surgical learning curve for prostate cancer control
after radical prostatectomy. J Natl Cancer Inst 99:
1171-1177, 2007
46. Yim GW, Kim SW, Nam EJ, et al: Learning
curve analysis of robot-assisted radical hysterectomy for cervical cancer: Initial experience at a
single institution. J Gynecol Oncol 24:303-312, 2013
47. Barrie J, Jayne DG, Wright J, et al: Attaining
surgical competency and its implications in surgical
clinical trial design: A systematic review of the
learning curve in laparoscopic and robot-assisted
laparoscopic colorectal cancer surgery. Ann Surg
Oncol 21:829-840, 2014
48. Mirheydar HS, Parsons JK: Diffusion of robotics into clinical practice in the United States: Process, patient safety, learning curves, and the public
health. World J Urol 31:455-461, 2013
49. Schreuder HW, Wolswijk R, Zweemer RP, et
al: Training and learning robotic surgery, time for a
more structured approach: A systematic review.
BJOG 119:137-149, 2012
50. Zorn KC, Gautam G, Shalhav AL, et al: Training, credentialing, proctoring and medicolegal risks
of robotic urological surgery: Recommendations of
the society of urologic robotic surgeons. J Urol
182:1126-1132, 2009
51. Marks LB, Light KL, Hubbs JL, et al: The
impact of advanced technologies on treatment deviations in radiation treatment delivery. Int J Radiat
Oncol Biol Phys 69:1579-1586, 2007
52. Mendenhall WM, Amdur RJ, Palta JR:
Intensity-modulated radiotherapy in the standard
management of head and neck cancer: Promises
and pitfalls. J Clin Oncol 24:2618-2623, 2006
53. Liu HW, Malkoske K, Sasaki D, et al: The
dosimetric quality of brachytherapy implants in patients with small prostate volume depends on the
experience of the brachytherapy team. Brachytherapy 9:202-207, 2010

54. Fairchild A, Straube W, Laurie F, et al: Does
quality of radiation therapy predict outcomes of multicenter cooperative group trials? A literature review. Int
J Radiat Oncol Biol Phys 87:246-260, 2013
55. Wick EC, Hobson DB, Bennett JL, et al:
Implementation of a surgical comprehensive unitbased safety program to reduce surgical site infections. J Am Coll Surg 215:193-200, 2012
56. Arriaga AF, Bader AM, Wong JM, et al:
Simulation-based trial of surgical-crisis checklists.
N Engl J Med 368:246-253, 2013
57. Valentin A: Approaches to decreasing medication and other care errors in the ICU. Curr Opin Crit
Care 19:474-479, 2013
58. Peters LJ, O’Sullivan B, Giralt J, et al: Critical
impact of radiotherapy protocol compliance and
quality in the treatment of advanced head and neck
cancer: Results from TROG 02.02. J Clin Oncol
28:2996-3001, 2010
59. Weber DC, Tomsej M, Melidis C, et al: QA
makes a clinical trial stronger: Evidence-based medicine in radiation therapy. Radiother Oncol 105:4-8,
2012
60. Brook RH: The RAND/UCLA Appropriateness
Method. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation,
1995
61. Efstathiou JA, Nassif DS, McNutt TR, et al:
Practice-based evidence to evidence-based practice: Building the National Radiation Oncology Registry. J Oncol Pract 9:e90-e95, 2013
62. Dodson JA, Reynolds MR, Bao H, et al: Developing a risk model for in-hospital adverse events
following ICD implantation: A report from the
NCDR® registry. J Am Coll Cardiol [epub ahead of
print on November 27, 2013]
63. Basch E, Abernethy AP, Mullins CD, et al:
Recommendations for incorporating patient-reported
outcomes into clinical comparative effectiveness research in adult oncology. J Clin Oncol 30:4249-4255,
2012
64. McCloskey SA, Kupelian P, Asch S, et al:
Adapting the PRO-CTCAE for patient reporting of
toxicity in radiation oncology. Int J Radiat Oncol Biol
Phys 84:S99-S100, 2012 (suppl)

■ ■ ■

2870

© 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology

JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY

